Do subatomic particles have free will?

[nabraxas]

By Julie Rehmeyer

Web edition : Friday, August 15th, 2008

If we have free will, so do subatomic particles, mathematicians claim to prove.

“If the atoms never swerve so as to originate some new movement that will snap the bonds of fate, the everlasting sequence of cause and effect—what is the source of the free will possessed by living things throughout the earth?”—Titus Lucretius Carus, Roman philosopher and poet, 99–55 BC.

Human free will might seem like the squishiest of philosophical subjects, way beyond the realm of mathematical demonstration. But two highly regarded Princeton mathematicians, John Conway and Simon Kochen, claim to have proven that if humans have even the tiniest amount of free will, then atoms themselves must also behave unpredictably.

The finding won’t give many physicists a moment’s worry, because traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics embrace unpredictability already. The best anyone can hope to do, quantum theory says, is predict the probability that a particle will behave in a certain way.

But physicists all the way back to Einstein have been unhappy with this idea. Einstein famously grumped, “God does not play dice.” And indeed, ever since the birth of quantum mechanics, some physicists have offered alternate interpretations of its equations that aim to get rid of this indeterminism. The most famous alternative is attributed to the physicist David Bohm, who argued in the 1950s that the behavior of subatomic particles is entirely determined by “hidden variables” that cannot be observed.

Conway and Kochen say this search is hopeless, and they claim to have proven that indeterminacy is inherent in the world itself, rather than just in quantum theory. And to Bohmians and other like-minded physicists, the pair says: Give up determinism, or give up free will. Even the tiniest bit of free will.

Their argument starts with a proof Kochen created with Ernst Specker 40 years ago. Subatomic particles have a property called “spin,” which occurs around any axis. Experiments have shown that a type of subatomic particle called a “spin 1 particle” has a peculiar property: Choose three perpendicular axes, and prod the spin 1 particle to determine whether its spin around each of those axes is 0. Precisely one of those axes will have spin 0 and the other two will have non-zero spin. Conway and Kochen call this the 1-0-1 rule.

Spin is one of those properties physicists can’t predict in advance, before prodding. Still, one might imagine that the particle’s spin around any axis was set before anyone ever came along to prod it. That’s certainly what we ordinarily assume in life. We don’t imagine, say, that a fence turned white just because we looked at it — we figure it was white all along.

But Kochen and Specker showed that this assumption — that the fence was white all along — can’t hold in the bizarre world of subatomic particles. They used a pure mathematical argument to show that there is no way the particle can choose spins around every imaginable axis in a way that is consistent with the 1-0-1 rule. Indeed, there is a set of just 33 axes that are enough to force the particle into a paradox. It could choose spins around the first 32 axes that conform with the rule, but for the last, neither 0 nor non-zero would do. Choosing zero spin would create a set of three perpendicular axes with two zeroes, and choosing non-zero spin would create a different set of three perpendicular axes with three non-zeroes, breaking the 1-0-1 rule either way.

This means that the particle cannot have a definite spin in every direction before it’s measured, Kochen and Specker concluded. If it did, physicists would be able to occasionally observe it breaking the 1-0-1 rule, which never happens. Instead, it must “decide” which spin to have on the fly.

Conway compares the situation to the game “Twenty Questions.” If you play the game fairly, you decide upfront on a single object and honestly answer each of the questions, hoping your opponent won’t deduce what you chose. But a clever player could also cheat, changing the object partway through. In that case, his answers aren’t determined in advance. The particle, Kochen and Specker showed, is like a cheating player. They found it out by showing that no single object satisfies all the “questions” (or all 33 axes) at once.

But there’s another possible interpretation. Perhaps the particle’s spin is completely determined — but depends on something else about the state of the universe. That would be like a player in “Twenty Questions” who has decided his object is a donkey whenever his opponent starts a question with “Is,” and that his object a horse otherwise (or using any other arbitrary but consistent rule). For example, if his opponent asked, “Is it something with big ears?” he would say “yes,” but if his opponent asked, “Does it have big ears?” he’d say “no.” In that case, his answers are predetermined even though he has no single object in mind.

Conway and Kochen say that they have now proven that particles’ responses can’t be pre-determined, even within this possible interpretation. “We can really prove that there’s no algorithm, no way that the particle can give an answer that is unique and can be specified ahead of time,” Conway says. “I’m still amazed that we can actually manage to prove that.”

They concocted a thought experiment for their proof. It is possible to entangle two spin 1 particles so that their spins are identical along every possible axis and will remain so, even if they are separated very far apart. Entangle two particles this way, and then send a physicist named Alice with one of them to Mars and leave the other with a physicist named Bob on Earth. That will prevent information from passing between the physicists or the particles, according to relativity theory. Alice and Bob each prod their particles along some axis, which they freely choose. If Alice and Bob happen to choose the same axis, they’ll get the same answer.

Now, imagine that the particles are like the “20 questions” player whose object is sometimes a donkey and sometimes a horse, with a fixed rule deciding when to answer with which animal. Whatever the rule is, it applies to each of the entangled particles and will cause them to have the same spins. It’s as if the “20 questions” player has been cloned, and both players are forced to give answers for the same animal.

But Conway and Kochen have shown this scenario is impossible for particles that are incommunicado. They invoked the old Kochen-Specker paradox to show that if the spin 1 particle’s behavior is pre-determined so that it isn’t allowed to “change its animal,” it won’t be able to give answers that are consistent with the 1-0-1 rule. So if Alice and Bob are lucky in how they choose their axes, they should be able to force the particles either to disagree or to violate the 1-0-1 rule — contrary to experimental evidence.

Kochen and Conway say the best way out of this paradox is to accept that the particle’s spin doesn’t exist until it’s measured. But there’s one way to escape their noose: Suppose for a moment that Alice and Bob’s choice of axis to measure is not a free choice. Then Nature could be conspiring to prevent them from choosing the axes that will reveal the violation of the rule. Kochen and Conway can’t rule that possibility out entirely, but Kochen says, “A man on the street would say, ‘Don’t be ridiculous.’ A natural feeling is, of course, that what we do, we do of our own free will. Not completely, but certainly to the point of knowing we can choose what button to push in an experiment.”

Ideally, a mathematical proof settles all uncertainty, but Kochen and Conway haven’t yet managed to convince many of the physicists they are addressing. “I’m not convinced,” says Sheldon Goldstein of Rutgers University, a Bohmian. He believes the argument implies nothing new, and he’s content with the notion that free will exists only effectively (not theoretically). He and his collaborators have spent many hours discussing these issues with the pair of mathematicians since Kochen and Conway first posted their result four years ago. Their new version, posted on Arxiv.org July 21, attempts to strengthen the result in light of criticisms. Still, mutual understanding has not yet come about. “It’s kind of depressing when people can’t communicate with each other,” Goldstein says. “We know that’s true in politics, but you’d think that wouldn’t be going on here.”

But Gerard ’t Hooft of the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands, who won the Nobel Prize in physics in 1999, says the pair’s conclusions are legitimate — but he chooses determinism over free will. “As a determined determinist I would say that yes, you bet, an experimenter's choice what to measure was fixed from the dawn of time, and so were the properties of the thing he decided to call a photon,” ’t Hooft says. “If you believe in determinism, you have to believe it all the way. No escape possible. Conway and Kochen have shown here in a beautiful way that a half-hearted belief in pseudo-determinism is impossible to sustain.”

http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id...ve_free_will%3F

[devance]

You will never know.

'“If the atoms never swerve so as to originate some new movement that will snap the bonds of fate, the everlasting sequence of cause and effect—what is the source of the free will possessed by living things throughout the earth?”—Titus Lucretius Carus, Roman philosopher and poet, 99–55 BC.'

I think its a fake.

And how could be elsewise.

Fake or not?

[ramon]

I think free will can both be real and fake.

In a infinite universe where everything that can possibly happen will happen, it is fake.

But out of all those realities you will only experience one, based upon the choices you make. Hence free will is real

[MindExpansion]

Free will can only be a result of chemistry, as chemicals control us, and chemistry relates to physics, so I believe that 'free will' is in some way controlled by physics and chemistry, but since all of our chemistry's are slightly different our 'free will' is different, which gives the illusion of truly 'free' will.

Peace,

Mind

[ballzac]

It doesn't matter whether everything is determined or probabilistic. Either way there is not free will. Either stuff happening randomly, or on a predetermined path. When I make a choice, what is actually choosing? I think it is this 'I', but this is such a slippery concept. I is just a collection of experiences. We give this some great importance because we have evolved to do so, but there is really no thing at the core of us that is making these choices.

[chilli]

What is the difference between free will and randomness?

[nabraxas]

What is the difference between free will and randomness?

Free will is often associated to randomness: a being has free will if it can perform "random" actions, as opposed to actions rigidly determined by the universal clockwork. In other words, free will can exist only if the laws of nature allow for some random solutions, solutions that can be arbitrarily chosen by our consciousness. If no randomness exists in nature, then every action (including our very conscious thoughts) is predetermined by a formula and free will cannot exist.

In their quest for the source of randomness in human free will, both neurophysiologists like John Eccles and physicists like Roger Penrose have proposed that quantum effects are responsible for creating randomness in the processes of the human brain. Whether chance and free will can be equated (free will is supposed to lead to rational and deterministic decisions, not random ones) and whether Quantum Theory is the only possible source of randomness is debatable.

Since we know that a lot of what goes on in the universe is indeed regulated by strict formulas, the hope for free will should rely not so much in randomness as in "fuzzyness". It is unlikely that the laws of nature hide a competely random property; on the other hand, they could be "fuzzy", in that they may prescribe a behavior but with a broad range of possible degrees.

More Here

[Undergrounder]

yeah all the relevant points have been made.. if free will is randomness, it's not free will.

But i'm studying the philosophy of quantum mechanics at this very moment, so give me another 8 weeks and i'll be a precocious little shit who claims to know everything on the subject. At the moment i'm struggling to hold on... particle spin is supposed to be the simplest example of 'entanglement', and realities collapsing down probability vectors into eigenvectors and all that shit. Even the lecturer admits that he doesn't know the reality of the situation and he's supposed to be Mr big time on the subject.

Edit: Even more of a precocious geek anyway.

Edited August 18, 2008 by Undergrounder

[nabraxas]

^ on the subject ov entanglement. if all matter came from the big bang, doesn't that mean that all particles were entangled from the start?

[Legba]

Perhaps sufficient entanglement is required for a big bang event to occur.

[Undergrounder]

^ on the subject ov entanglement. if all matter came from the big bang, doesn't that mean that all particles were entangled from the start?

now that you mention it, i was confused about this in the lectures... does entanglement have a beginning and/or an end? what is it that causes those two specific particles to be entangled? Is it because those two electrons are in opposite spin, or due to them both being created at the same time? I was confused, and the lecturer thought i was asking the question "what is entanglement?" I know that i don't know what entanglement is, but what i don't know is why it is that those two specific particles are entangled?

[Alice]

Free will can only be a result of chemistry, as chemicals control us,

Do they? Lets imagine for a moment that there comes a day when the exact arrangement/position of every atom in our bodies can be determined and another identical "me" could then be assembled from scratch. Would my clone behave the same? Have the same thoughts? Same memories? Instinctively I would say no, because it is no longer me. My clone exists outside of my body. But if the chemistry is the same, is identical, how could I not also be the same?

[ballzac]

Do they? Lets imagine for a moment that there comes a day when the exact arrangement/position of every atom in our bodies can be determined and another identical "me" could then be assembled from scratch. Would my clone behave the same? Have the same thoughts? Same memories?

Yes, until external factors or random events caused differences to appear.

[Alice]

Yes, until external factors or random events caused differences to appear.

Ok, but what about memory? Would my clone have memories of events in my life that occurred prior to the clone being assembled?

Edited August 19, 2008 by Alice

[Undergrounder]

Yes if you're a materialist, and No if you're a dualist.

[chilli]

Yes if you're a materialist, and No if you're a dualist.

Maybe if you're a holist

Anyway, why No if you're a dualist?

I don't think many dualists would deny that memories are stored in the brain.

[Undergrounder]

becaaaauuuse... (damn quote is on the other page... just a sec)

"Lets imagine for a moment that there comes a day when the exact arrangement/position of every atom in our bodies can be determined and another identical "me" could then be assembled from scratch... But if the chemistry is the same, is identical, how could I not also be the same"

(taking the classic form of dualism here, call it 'substance dualism' - the belief that mental stuff is a different kind of stuff to physical stuff like atoms)

Because if every atom has been copied and placed in the new body, and it contains everything that is required for you to be you, then you're saying that the 'soul' and thoughts are entirely physical things, so you're a materialist. If you say No, that there is more to me than my physical parts, perhaps my soul and thoughts are not transferred, then you're saying that there are certain parts of 'you' that not physical, ie: that is made up of a different kind of thing, so you're probably a dualist. (or at the very least, not a materialist).

[ballzac]

Don't quote me at all on this, as I'm no expert on philosophy, but I would think that today most dualists (I'm only counting the well educated here) would agree that memories are stored in the brain. This is the main reason I don't believe in a 'soul' at all. Once you reduce everything to brain states, there is nothing left.

But it is certainly possible for someone who believes in a soul to also believe that the memories that are attached to that soul are stored in the brain. What they might dispute though, is that the clone have a soul at all. Again, I find this suggests that the sould does not exist, because if you remove the soul from the equation this problem disappears.

[devance]

There is both.

Subatomic particles obey the laws of physics.

Not a software philosophical outlook.

On the other the mind is above such random mathematical outlook.

If everything was random how can a structured model of particle physics arise.

Or consciouness.

So both.

The physcists wants a mathematical equation that explains things.

Which will occur.

The theory of Everything theory.

A TOE as its called.

The philosopher [the mind]wants something above such randomness or predictabilty.

So both are true.

Trying to seperate the two is a useless as Solomon seperating the baby with a sword [ a parable I hope].

A non living baby is the results.

[Undergrounder]

Don't quote me at all on this, as I'm no expert on philosophy, but I would think that today most dualists (I'm only counting the well educated here) would agree that memories are stored in the brain.

But it is certainly possible for someone who believes in a soul to also believe that the memories that are attached to that soul are stored in the brain. What they might dispute though, is that the clone have a soul at all. Again, I find this suggests that the sould does not exist, because if you remove the soul from the equation this problem disappears.

You're probably right, and the main 'other' form of dualism is called 'attribute dualism', or 'property dualism', whereby the physical body instantiates special properties, or attributes of mental states that are themselves non-physical. In other words, mental states are brain-based, but the brain merely instantiates the non-material mental 'stuff' on top... this is supposed to account for the fact that clearly, mental processes are based on the physical brain (eg: dementia, brain damage, etc.), yet still makes way for the mental to exist completely separately from the physical.

If you talk about souls though, you're more in the area of 'substance dualism', where the physical and mental are completely different, and for instance when our physical body dies, our soul survives because it is not part of the physical world. I think most people think of substance dualism when they talk about a soul, and it's probably the more popular form.

BUT, as you say, in order to get around the brain-based problem, most contemporary philosophers who are into dualism are more likely some for of attribute dualists.

... returning to the original question... if you take a body and re-create it bit by bit as a perfect physical body, then yeah technically an attribute dualist could say YES to that question. But if you accept that the physical brain can account for a perfectly working mental world, and that somehow this mental 'stuff' instantiates itself from it, then what makes you believe in dualism at all? Why not just take a slice with occam's beard trimmer and be happy with materialism?

[reptyle]

ok so this is reality. it exists as is in its

wholeness.

and this is what we are, travelling throughout the wholeness. experincing many differnt types of observational points, which includes personality doubles, non-existance, and the stable unmoving big bang right in the centre at which point stillness, clearlight, and bodhi exist.

quantuum man...

[reptyle]

do you see, do you see???

[Undergrounder]

do you see, do you see???

LOL no i don't sorry although it's a cool looking fish. (If it is a fish)

[caludia]

I think it's like the turtles anecdote

"the earth sits on a turtle"

"what does the turtle sit on?"

"no use asking, buddy... it's turtles all the way down"

i reckon consciousness wouldn't be an emergent phenomenon of complexity, for that would be like creation ex nihilo

so everything, all the way down (and up), must have the spark

and this of course leads to pantheism (or panentheism if you are not assuming that what you see is all there is)

[ballzac]

I agree, pantheism...or solipsism (I ignore the latter because it makes me shudder). But I still think that the complexity can cause the smaller conscious parts to be organised in a way that wouldn't exist without the complexity and this gives rise to a type of conscsiousness that wouldn't otherwise exist. I actually think it is possible that consciousness is somehow related to entropy. Entropy also appears to arise ex nihilo. Not all quantities obey conservation laws. I am only aware of two things that define the flow of time: my own consciousness, and an increase of entropy in a closed system. It seems logical that the two are related. How do I know that entropy is increasing and not decreasing? At one temporal coordinate it is measured to be at one value, at another temporal coordinate it is measured to be a different value. How do I know that the higher value comes after the lower value? It is because my conscious mind is aware of the direction of time. It seems logical to hypothesize that the increase in entropy in my brain is integral in the production of consciousness. It may also be to do with the complexity of the system. For example, the ice melting in my glass may be aware of the flow of time due to an increase in entropy, but the level of complexity of the system is very low so it does not have a profound level of consciousness.