Hushmail not secure

[Torsten]

Not that I ever trusted hushmail, but I know lots of others did.

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http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/08/hu...ders/print.html

Hushmail open to Feds with court orders

By John Leyden

Published Thursday 8th November 2007 13:36 GMT

US federal law enforcement agencies have obtained access to clear text copies of encrypted emails sent through Hushmail as part a of recent drug trafficking investigation.

The access was only granted after a court order was served on Hush Communications, the Canadian firm that offers the service.

Hush Communications said it would only accede to requests made in respect to targeted accounts and via court orders filed through Canadian court.

Nonetheless, the incident illustrates that Hushmail's marketing claims that not even its own staff can access encrypted email is well wide of the mark.

September court documents (pdf (http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/steroids.source.prod_affiliate.25.pdf)) from a US federal prosecution of alleged steroid dealers reveals that Hush turned over 12 CDs involving emails on three targeted Hushmail accounts, in compliance of court orders made through the mutual assistance treaty between the US and Canada.

Hushmail is widely used by privacy advocates and the security-conscious to send confidential emails. The service uses robust cryptographic and encryption protocols (OpenPGP and AES 256) to scramble the contents of messages stored on its servers, and to exchange encrypted messages with other encrypted email users.

Breaking messages encrypted by the service by brute force would be nigh-on impossible. So how was access to clear-text messages obtained? An investigation by Wired reveals that a server-side encryption option introduced by Hushmail in 2006 means that a copy of a user's passphrase, which gives access to encrypted messages, might be obtained.

"In the case of the alleged steroid dealer, the feds seemed to compel Hushmail to exploit this hole, store the suspects' secret passphrase or decryption key, decrypt their messages, and hand them over," Wired reports (http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai.html).

Brewing up a storm

Hushmail introduced the server-side encryption option because some users found installing and running a Java applet to be slow and annoying. In its original form this Java applet was used to perform the encryption and decryption of messages on a user's computer.

In this scenario, a clear text copy of a message would never hit Hushmail's servers so Hush would only be able to respond to law enforcement requests with scrambled messages, at least in theory. In practice, Hushmail's Java architecture still permits a mechanism for the recovery of scrambled emails in clear-text form.

Brian Smith, chief technology officer of Hushmail, declined to speak about specific law enforcement requests. However he was more forthcoming in explaining the technology implications of Hushmail's server-side encryption options.

"The key point, though, is that in the non-Java configuration, private key and passphrase operations are performed on the server-side. This requires that users place a higher level of trust in our servers as a trade off for the better usability they get from not having to install Java and load an applet," he said.

"This might clarify things a bit when you are considering what actions we might be required to take under a court order. Again, I stress that our requirement in complying with a court order is that we not take actions that would affect users other than those specifically named in the order."

As Wired notes, Hushmail's marketing collateral fails to stress the implications of using the non-Java option. Even the non-Java option might not be entirely secure. Hush may be obliged to rig the Java applet sent to targeted users with a backdoor designed to capture their passwords, Wired implies.

It explains that "Hushmail's own threat matrix includes this possibility, saying that if an attacker got into Hushmail's servers, they could compromise an account - but that 'evidence of the attack' (presumably the rogue Java applet) could be found on the user's computer."

The upshot of this is that a paranoid user might be able to detect - if not prevent - if his Hushmail account is being interfered with, but only if he uses the Java applet option.

"This means that in Java mode the level of trust the user must place in us is somewhat reduced, although not eliminated," Hushmail's Smith told Wired. "The extra security given by the Java applet is not particularly relevant, in the practical sense, if an individual account is targeted."

Smith told Wired that those looking to Hushmail as a safe haven for snooping on illegal activity were out of luck. However, he added that the firm, unlike US telecoms firms involved in the controversy over the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program, would resist mass surveillance efforts.

"[Hushmail] is useful for avoiding general Carnivore-type government surveillance, and protecting your data from hackers, but definitely not suitable for protecting your data if you are engaging in illegal activity that could result in a Canadian court order," Smith told Wired.

"That's also backed up by the fact that all Hushmail users agree to our terms of service, which state that Hushmail is not to be used for illegal activity. However, when using Hushmail, users can be assured that no access to data (including server logs, etc.) will be granted without a specific court order.

"We receive many requests for information from law enforcement authorities, including subpoenas, but on being made aware of the requirements, a large percentage of them do not proceed," said Smith.

"To date, we have not challenged a court order in court, as we have made it clear that the court orders that we would accept must follow our guidelines of requiring only actions that can be limited to the specific user accounts named in the court order. That is to say, any sort of requirement for broad data collection would not be acceptable." ®

[CyberCat]

The Feds exploited a weakness in Hushmail's non-java applet users. The Hushmail encryption java applet ensures the highest secure cryptology. Ensure you use the java applet.

http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/11/e...pted-e-mai.html

The first time a Hushmail user logs on, his browser downloads a Java applet that takes care of the decryption and encryption of messages on his computer, after the user types in the right passphrase. So messages reach Hushmail's server already encrypted. The Java code also decrypts the message on the recipient's computer, so an unencrypted copy never crosses the internet or hits Hushmails servers.

In this scenario, if a law enforcement agency demands all the e-mails sent to or from an account, Hushmail can only turn over the scrambled messages since it has no way of reversing the encryption.

When using this secure web-based email system, you have the option of enabling or disabling Java support. Turning on Java provides an additional layer of security, but is not necessary for secure communication using this system. To learn how to install Java, click here (recommended). https://www.hushmail.com/hushmail/showHelpF...java/index.html

Using PGP and the Hushmail encryption java applet, will ensure security and privacy.

Read this too. http://www.shaman-australis.com/forum/inde...showtopic=16361

Edited November 14, 2007 by CyberCat

[Torsten]

The article indicates this is not the case.

In its original form this Java applet was used to perform the encryption and decryption of messages on a user's computer.

In this scenario, a clear text copy of a message would never hit Hushmail's servers so Hush would only be able to respond to law enforcement requests with scrambled messages, at least in theory. In practice, Hushmail's Java architecture still permits a mechanism for the recovery of scrambled emails in clear-text form.

[bloodbob]

If you have no trusted channel it is impossible to securely communicate. Its a fundmental truth in cryptography. A particular issue is self signed SSL/TLS certificates as unless you monitor that certifcate to make sure it hasn't changed it is simple for someone to do a MITM. Now i'd assume the US government could probably pressure companies like verisign to fake certificate for drug busts which means you probably should trust certificate authorities. Of course they can always go to the end box after the encryption as well. ASIO can put monitoring devices on your, your vehicles and in your home for up to 6 months.

Edited November 14, 2007 by bloodbob

[CyberCat]

The article indicates this is not the case.

In its original form this Java applet was used to perform the encryption and decryption of messages on a user's computer.

In this scenario, a clear text copy of a message would never hit Hushmail's servers so Hush would only be able to respond to law enforcement requests with scrambled messages, at least in theory. In practice, Hushmail's Java architecture still permits a mechanism for the recovery of scrambled emails in clear-text form.

There is no absolute evidence at this point that this is occurring. However, since HushMail will comply with all court orders issued by the British Columbia Supreme Court, it does open the question of...

Smith concurs and hints that Hushmail's Java architecture doesn't technically prohibit the company from being able to turn over unscrambled emails to cops with court orders.

...if a Hushmail account is targeted my cops with court orders.

Therefore, if you need to communicate with other Hushmail users, PGP encrypt your message first, then login to Hushmail in java applet mode (so your password IS NOT sent to Hushmail's server for server-side encryption) and send your PGP/Hushmail java applet encrypted message.

It is advised you avoid Hushmail and MailVault altogether, and create your own secure system if you want control of who has access to the server.

Edited November 14, 2007 by CyberCat