mr toodly

Though I'm not so sure it will be of any help at all. All well. I guess I'm just under a lot of stress and nothing is coming out right. I'll try to contribute something better when things settle down. IB, I have really enjoyed exchanging with you, but I think I have done more harm than good. I have been semi-disoriented lately (might be due to a thyroid disorder - waiting for test results) and I should not have crashed your thread - not in this state. caro

If the two terms are normally used as exact logical opposites, then there should be no middle ground. But before we decide that this is the case, we should be sure that this is how the terms are usually used, and I'm not so sure of this. There has never been any misunderstanding here. I was talking about conceptual relations. Concepts don't get probable in this sense: We're doing arithmetic. If you know how the numeral '1' is used and you know how the numeral '2' is used, and you know how this notation is used: 1+1=2, it would be pretty absurd to say that 1+1 is probably 2. You will agree to this. We would never (say) create a frequency distribution for every time 1+1 resulted in 2 and calculate the probability. Similarly, when we use words like 'dog' and 'cat', we do not go out into the world to ensure that there is no mutually inclusive case between the two words, something we could call a dog, but also a cat. What we call a dog (in this sense) is never going to be a cat. Now, some mad scientist might create something that seems to be a perfect mixture of a dog and a cat, and we might then adopt the convention of calling this thing either a dog or a cat, but notice that this is a new sense and a new use of those words. This is also an apt time to talk about vagueness. There could be a case in which it is unclear whether we should call something a dog or a cat. We do not know how these words, taken from practical language, should be used. This happens very often in our cacti forums when Archaea and M. Smith argue fruitlessly about whether something is T. pachanoi or T. peruvianus. This also seems to be what you have in mind. In this case, Smith might say, "Archaea, this specimen is probably T. peruvianus because of morphological features x,y,z - which are included in BotanistA's description of T. peruvianus." But recall that I never said that our applications of concepts could never (in the aforementioned sense), be probable (see: "Since it's very clear that we are talking about the relationship between concepts.."). I said that when we know what we are talking about (i.e. when we do not encounter a case of vagueness and we are sufficiently familiar with our terms), the relations between concepts should be quite clear. We should know that the dog class will not be included in the class of cats, but that both would be classed under the concept of mammals. The relations will not change unless we alter the way we use our terms. I think for the most part we have been talking at cross-purposes. I am sorry for that. That's right. I never accused you of any of this. "You don't know what you're talking about" pertained to conceptual relations and probability. I'm not especially interested in the content of this topic. However, I hope that some of the things we have discussed will lend clarity to further discussion in this thread.

A) seems superfluous. You need something else to get from to C), i.e. that there are no non-absolute, non-relative truths. I am just not sure these concepts are linked in the way you think they are. In order for you to make a conclusion like C) you must think that excludes everything except the conclusion in C), which again, is not really the case unless we define 'absolute truth' as the negation of the 'relative' type or vice versa. About your "I'm not shooting for a watertight deductive argument" comment: With no ill will, I'm inclined to say that you do not know what you're talking about. Since it's very clear that we are talking about the relationship between concepts, and the last time I checked one was not able to go out in the world and survey concepts (i.e. as you would for say, the morphology of cactii) and make generalizations about their relations. Concepts don't get probable. We should know how they are related (because we should know what they mean). If we don't know how they're related, we don't know what we're talking about. That means it's time for definitions and examples. Anyway. It has been okay exchanging with you. I'm going away (hopefully later today), so I may not respond for a number of months. -bert

I don't think you are using the word "absolute" incorrectly. I have witnessed a number of people use that word the way you have been using it. But I find that these people typically fail to illustrate how the term works or how it is used. The result is that I feel I must play a little game of fishing to figure out usage. Your arguments here are only applicable to moral relativism, not cognitive or epistemic relativism. People may not state it such a simplistic form, but intelligent people seem to believe it. e.g. The miasmatic theory of disease. Crudely: where fetid odors obtain, cholera (other diseases) infect and kill. Fetid odors are the causes of disease. Eliminate the fetid odors, and eliminate the disease. or You are stuck in traffic. You see bright lights ahead. You believe something like, "A UFO has landed on the freeway and blocked traffic." (The traffic jam was really caused by an auto with a flat) The facts are consistent with each hypothesis. The miasmatic theory example even provided a working principle. The fact that we have a working principle tempts us to believe that odor causes disease. In many cases, this will suit us well, especially if we are only interested in diseases like cholera. And if we live in a society where it is not practicable to eliminate all fetid odors (and discover inconsistencies - people getting cholera regardless when fetid odors are absent) we shall have to be very creative to discover any problems with the miasmatic theory (i.e. Pasteur, etc). The UFO example is unparsimonious, but there is still consistency. If there is a UFO on the road (and say, it is constructed out of a solid material) it will block traffic. I think that this sort of consistency tends to intoxicate people. They will (say) observe ethical differences between cultures and assent to relativistic moral theories without thinking of other possibilities. Some have suggested that it is not that our (in a worldwide, universal sense) ethical beliefs tbat differ so greatly and lack any common features, but our interpretations of phenomena. I'll give an example of this if you ask for it. For some reason I find typing into this forum console excruciating, and I don't want to do it anymore, but something keeps pushing me on. Please tell me what you think the conditions of validity are.

No. Other relations are possible when A obtains. It means that there is one "absolute truth" (or whatever), but it might not be one that is very useful to you.

Yes, it's just a description of what you think most people believe. Your idea about the implications between the first two propositions was wrong, though. The statement is not "not absolute" (as you seem to be using the word) because it's normative. It's not "absolute" because 'all beliefs except x,y,z should be tolerated' looks like it's reducible to 'some beliefs should be tolerated.' Do you think any intelligent person would say, "all truth is relative, therefore all beliefs are valid"? I think that if you want to be fair, you need to say something like: all/most moral principles can only be said to be right or wrong within their socio-cultural context. Your opponents will list a few socio-cultural practices and principles held by different cultures. They will try to argue that custom is king, or something like that, because we see such a great variety of ethical practices across cultures. I think you just need to remember that a state of affairs or states of affairs can be consistent with a proposition or hypothesis without the hypothesis being true.

Torsten, I guess this isn't exactly the right place, but has it been your experience (as a Germanophone fluent in English) that you can sometimes follow Dutch? 'tegen' looks a lot like 'gegen', but that's about all I can see.

Or rather, one isn't implied by the other. There might be no absolute truths, but no relative ones either. Or there could be one absolute truth: that there are no absolute truths (i.e. except this one). And so on.

If you were the least bit serious (or intellectually charitable for that matter), you might give examples of my misinterpretations and show me where I went wrong. The professionals do it all the time (with the exception of Derrida). It is really a bit strange that you would accuse me of having an adversarial attitude, when I have always asked you for explanations and clarity and you have acted like a person under siege. It does not seem like you want to be understood. It seems like you enjoy saying, "NO! YOU HAVEN'T UNDERSTOOD ME!" and slapping your opponent (or whatever) on the head. That's your prerogative. When you're ready to be open, give me a ring.

There is a subconscious? Where?

There is a difference between the statement "there are no absolute [truths]" and the statement "all truths are relative." That all truths should be tolerated does not seem to follow from either of these statements. They are both descriptive, but the statement about toleration is normative. One might avoid this problem by saying that there are absolute truths, just none of ethical importance. This is probably what most of your opponents have in mind, anyway. 'All beliefs should be tolerated, except those which claim absolute truth" does not appear to be "a claim to an absolute truth." The sentence does not seem to be like (say) "All dogs are black." (if that's an absolute truth?) It is not clear how we would provide any counter-example to the sentence above ('All beliefs should..'). We certainly could not adduce what we would normally call evidence. No, to argue against such a claim, we would have to find some other normative claim the person believes (or most people would believe) that would be inconsistent with his statement about toleration. i.e. you are using the word "truth" in at least two different ways. I'll clarify after I get some sleep.

Thelema, I would like to respond to this post since you are the only person who has asked for a reply. However, I have been thinking about this for a while, and I have decided not to take your suggestion seriously, because you did not so much as cite an example of me misconstruing the cases you gave above. I have watched you for two years, and it seems like you really enjoy wallowing in obscurity. The well is deep when one can't see the bottom, right?

!!! If you are implying that he believes most of his customers are drug users, then it appears that the 'dim view' is a rather accurate in this case. But everything else aside, I agree that this is very sleazy (if it is true). Kudos for eliminating that guy. I like that.

Seems like you're shifting the burden of proof. But here are some other possibilities: New plants were transported to Los Genteles local by people "" by animals "" by one of the elements To make your case, you have to rule out those cases. But most of us will just sit and wonder why it is so important for you to make your case. This stuff is just so obsessive and non-productive.